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The Contract Clause: A Return to the
Original Understanding*
By DOUGLAS W. KMIEC**
AND JOHN 0. MCGINNIS***
Introduction
The Contract Clause provides: "No State shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."1 As one of the few prohibitions
the Framers of the Constitution imposed on the states, and one of a
handful of prohibitions that relate to the rights of private individuals
rather than the prerogatives of the federal government,2 the Clause was
clearly of significance to the Framers. In the first sixty years under the
Constitution, the Clause was often litigated and was given an interpreta-
* An earlier version of this Article was delivered by Professor Kmiec at the Attorney
General's Conference on Economic Liberties in Washington, D.C. Mr. McGinnis
acknowledges a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities to attend a seminar
"The Framers' Constitution" which enabled him to conduct research on the subject of this
paper. He is grateful to Professors Philip Kurland and Ralph Lemer and the other seminar
participants for their helpful criticism. Professor Kmiec and Mr. McGinnis would also like to
thank their colleagues Bradford Clark, Gary Lawson, Nelson Lund and Marc Miller for their
observations on the paper. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and not
necessarily those of the Department of Justice.
** Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Jus-
tice; Professor of Law (on leave), University of Notre Dame.
*** Attorney-Advisor, Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice; B.A.,
Harvard College, 1978; M.A., Balloil College, Oxford, 1980; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983.
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
2. Section 10 of Article I catalogues these prohibitions:
[.] No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing
but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex
post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.
[2.] No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State
on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and
all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the Congress.
[3.] No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Ton-
nage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actu-
ally invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
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tion of significant scope. By the midpoint of this century, however, the
Clause was construed so narrowly that it became little more than a his-
torical curiosity. Although the Supreme Court has revived the Clause
somewhat in recent years, it has not restored it to its original importance.
Correctly interpreted, the Contract Clause prohibits all retrospec-
tive, redistributive legislation which violates vested contractual rights by
transferring all or part of the benefit of a bargain from one contracting
party to another.3 This interpretation is supported on several grounds.
First, the interpretation has very substantial support in the history of the
Clause at the Constitutional Convention and the ratifying conventions in
the several states. Second, this construction of the Clause can be applied
in a neutral manner that requires a minimal amount of judicial balancing
of interests.' Third, and most fundamentally, the interpretation of the
Contract Clause as a prohibition against retrospective interference with
contracts comports with the ideal of government that the Framers actu-
ally possessed: namely, a government constrained by a concept of the
rule of law, restrained in circumstances which present particular risks of
majoritarian disregard for minority rights, and rendered stable by barri-
ers against abrupt change in social policy and organization.
The early period of contract clause jurisprudence was largely faith-
ful to this original understanding of the Clause. Since then, the Clause
has fallen into desuetude. Misinterpreted as a form of substantive eco-
nomic due process, the Clause was wrongly discredited when that doc-
trine was rightly discarded. The Court's recent jurisprudence concerning
the Contract Clause represents a step in the direction of the original un-
derstanding, but it leaves the Framers' intent unfulfilled, because the
scrutiny applied to state retrospective legislation is too lenient and the
objects of the Court's protection are too limited. In arguing for a return
to the original understanding of the Contract Clause, we anticipate and
respond to concerns that the current, narrow interpretation of the Clause
is necessary to permit the operation of the modern regulatory and welfare
state. We also question Professor Richard Epstein's well-crafted, but
3. A specific intent to redistribute resources between the parties is not a prerequisite to a
contract clause violation. If the natural consequence of the legislation is to redistribute re-
sources between contracting parties, the legislation is at odds with the Contract Clause. For a
discussion of examples of legislation which illustrates this point, see infra text accompanying
notes 132-135.
4. See Note, A Procedural Approach to the Contract Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 918 (1984)
[hereinafter Note, A Procedural Approach] (arguing that a balancing approach to the Contract
Clause is undesirable because it "creates uncertainty in the law and undermines the integrity of
the legal system"). The author of this Note also argues that the Contract Clause prohibits all
retrospective impairments of contracts.
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ahistorical argument in favor of giving the Clause even broader scope
through application to prospective as well as retrospective laws.
1. Understanding the Contract Clause: The Rule of Law,
Factionalism, and Political Stability
John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government,5 the primer on
just government at the time of the Nation's founding, makes clear that
the rule of law was a presupposition of liberty in a civil society. For
Locke, as for many modem theorists of the rule of law, 6 liberty in a civil
society is the ability to live "within the Allowance of [the] Laws."'7 How-
ever, to conform to the law one must be able to know it; one cannot know
what does not exist. Therefore, when Locke speaks of law in civil society
he speaks of "settled standing Laws."8 No man would yield his liberty to
civil society if an arbitrary will could apply laws retrospectively to con-
duct that conformed to the law at the time it was undertaken.9 The task
of the Framers was to translate this basic postulate of just government
into rules of practical application by which governing power could be
restrained from departing from "settled standing Laws" and injuring in-
terests which were created in reliance on such laws. Such practical laws
obviously had to be framed with a view to protecting the most significant
interests from such situations in which arbitrary will would most likely
be exercised.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the rule of law is a concept that
animates the entire Constitution. The prohibitions against bills of attain-
der, and ex post facto laws,10 and takings of property without just com-
pensation, 1 are all derived from strands of the concept of the rule of law:
laws must be general, prospective, and relatively stable.2 The Contract
Clause, like the Ex Post Facto Clause, is particularly concerned with the
5. J. LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON CIVIL GOVERNMENT 324 (Laslett ed. 1980) (em-
phasis omitted).
6. See, eg., Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtues, in LIBERTY AND THE RULE OF LAW
6-7 (R. Cunningham ed. 1979).
7. J. LOCKE, supra note 5, at 324.
8. Id. at 377.
9. In Locke's words:
Absolute Arbitrary Power, or Governing without settled standing Laws, can neither
of them consist with the ends of Society and Government, which Men would not quit
the freedom of the state of Nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to
preserve the Lives Liberties and Fortunes; and by stated Rules of Right and Property
to secure their Peace and Quiet.
Id. (emphasis in original).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. This formulation of the rule of law is taken from Raz, supra note 6, at 6-7.
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requirement of prospectivity. Prospectivity is an essential requirement of
the rule of law because only prospective laws allow citizens to plan their
conduct so as to conform to the law.13
The requirement that legislation be prospective is easier stated than
applied. As the Framers knew, a generalized prohibition against all ret-
rospective rules might render the legislature powerless. Almost all laws
operate retrospectively in that they must defeat the subjective expecta-
tions of those who planned their conduct according to the existing law. 14
Therefore, in implementing the requirement of prospectivity, the Fram-
ers had to choose a few fundamental contexts in which to afford citizens
a safe harbor from retrospective legislation while preserving the legisla-
tive function. The Framers chose contractual rights and liberty from
criminal sanctions. Importantly, by stating the prohibition against retro-
active legislation in terms of a tangible interest, like a vested contract, the
Framers established a set of fairly narrow principles capable of judicial
application.' 5
While the Framers did not believe that representative government
inevitably led to legislation that oppressed minority rights in violation of
the rule of law, they were concerned that factions, isolated and bereft of
allies, would be oppressed. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison argued
that in large republics such oppression is unlikely, because the diversity
of factions will counterbalance one another.16 Significantly, however,
Madison believed that the prohibition against violation of contracts
should apply to state governments, because such small republics would
not likely have sufficient diversity of faction to prevent oppression.17 In
terms of the Madisonian understanding of factions, one can readily un-
derstand why those with vested and beneficial contractual rights might
be isolated. Those who stand to benefit from contract are identifiable,
13. Professor Hayek has summarized this view as a requirement that government act
through "rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use
its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one's individual affairs on the basis of
this knowledge." F. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (rev. ed. 1976) (quoted in Note,
Rediscovering the Contract Clause, 97 HARv. L. Rav. 1414, 1426 (1984) [hereinafter Note,
Rediscovering the Contract Clause]).
14. See infra note 31.
15. One rationale for the Contract Clause may be related to the theory of separation of
powers. It is the province of the legislature to announce prospective law; it is the province of
the judiciary to declare the rights under existing law. See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87, 136 (1810) ("It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the
government of society, the application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be
the duty of [the judiciary].").
16. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61-62 (J. Madison) (Modem Library ed. 1961).
17. See Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in 1 P.
KURLAND & R. LERNER, THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 646-47 (1986).
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and those who are obligated by contract have an obvious interest in
avoiding their obligations. Moreover, any loss from legislation impairing
such existing contractual obligations would be borne entirely by those
who benefit from them. 8 In short, legislation redistributing resources
between parties to a contract by voiding obligations presents a particular
danger of oppression to a minority interest or faction.
The interpretation of the Contract Clause as a prohibition against
retrospective interference also comports with the Framers' deep interest
in promoting stability, even at the expense of immediate implementation
of the popular will. Because they believed that republican government
would be endangered if policies were susceptible to change by impas-
sioned and momentary majorities, the Framers created barriers to pro-
tect social stability against such change.19 Thus, even if the Contract
Clause retards democratic change by forcing legislatures to defer policy
changes until current contractual obligations are satisfied, the delay is
wholly consistent with the Framers' general desire to temper abrupt
changes in social policy, however popular, in the interest of stability.
II. The Origins of the Contract Clause
What is known of the origins of the Contract Clause supports the
proposition that the Clause is intended to prohibit retrospective legisla-
tion interfering with contractual rights. The actual proposal for a Con-
tract Clause was made at the Constitutional Convention on August 28,
1787 by Rufus King. To a section already prohibiting bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws, King moved to add a provision prohibiting inter-
ference with contracts "in the words used by the Ordinance of Cong[ress]
establishing new States."' 20  This statement strongly suggests that the
18. In contrast, prospective economic legislation has a more diffuse effect and therefore
those most adversely affected by it will likely have a significant number of natural allies in the
political process. See infra note 141 and accompanying text.
19. For instance, in order to prevent rapid changes in policy, the Framers instituted six
year terms for members of the Senate. See, eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 406 (J. Madison)
(Modem Library ed. 1961). In justifying the creation of the Senate, Madison catalogued the
dangers of "mutable policy":
The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more calamitous. It poisons the
blessings of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people, that the laws are made
by men of their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or
so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before
they are promulgated, or undergo such incessant changes that no man, who knows
what the law is today, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a
rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less fixed?
Id.
20. Madison reports King's remarks as follows: "Mr. King moved to add, in the words
used in the Ordinance of Cong[ress] establishing new states a prohibition on the States to
interfere in private contracts." 2 J. MADISON, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
SPring 19871
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Contract Clause was modeled on this ordinance-the Ordinance of the
Northwest Territory2 1-which Congress had established under the au-
thority of the Articles of Confederation just six weeks before. The rele-
vant clause in the Ordinance provided:
And in the just preservation of rights and property, it is under-
stood and declared, that no law ought ever to be made, or have
force in the said territory, that shall in any manner whatever inter-
fere with, or affect private contracts, or engagements, bona fide,
and without fraud previously formed. 2
The phrasing makes clear that this Clause was designed to prohibit the
states of the Northwest Territory from interfering with vested property
and contract rights through the passage of retrospective laws. This inter-
pretation is confirmed by the placement of the Clause directly after a
clause that prohibited the taking of property or services without compen-
sation.z3 Laws taking property are obviously retrospective laws, because
they abrogate rights possessed by property owners under prior positive
law.
Governor Morris of Pennsylvania immediately objected to King's
proposal on the grounds that it interfered with majoritarian rule in the
states.24 Madison acknowledged the "inconvenience" that would be
caused by the frustration of majority will "but thought on the whole it
would be overbalanced by the utility of it."2 Madison's journals do not
TION 439 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). King's express limitation of the clause to private contracts
seems to have disappeared at some point because the version of the clause that emerged from
the Constitutional Convention did not make any distinction between public and private con-
tracts. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), the first significant decision applying
the Contract Clause, Chief Justice Marshall held that public contracts also came within the
ambit of the Clause. For a full discussion of the debates at the Convention relating to the
Contract Clause, see B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE CONSTITUTION 1-12
(1938).
21. An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States North-West
of the River Ohio, 1 Stat. 51 (1789).
22. Id.
23. This Clause provided in full: "[A]nd should the public exigencies make it necessary,
for the common preservation, to take any person's property, or to demand his particular serv-
ices, full compensation shall be made for the same." Id.
24. Madison reports Morris' remarks as follows:
This would be going too far. There are a thousand laws relating to bringing ac-
tions-limitations of actions which affect contracts-The Judicial power of the U.S.
will be a protection in cases within their jurisdiction; and within the State itself a
majority must rule, whatever may be the mischief done among themselves.
J. MADISON, supra note 20, at 439 (emphasis added).
25. In full, Madison remembered his statement as follows:
Mr. Madison admitted that inconveniences might arise from such a prohibition but
thought on the whole it would be overbalanced by the utility of it. He conceived
however that a negative on the State laws could alone secure the effect. Evasions
might and would be devised by the ingenuity of the Legislatures ....
W'ol. 14:525
specify what he saw as the purpose of the Clause; however, the North-
west Ordinance to which King referred in introducing the contract
clause provision presents a clear purpose-namely, "the just preservation
of the rights and property" from retrospective legislation. 6 After
Madison's remark, Colonel Mason of Virginia, soon to be an ardent anti-
federalist, renewed the kind of objections expressed by Governor Morris,
saying that "cases will happen that cannot be foreseen, where some kind
of interference will be [proper and essential]." ' 7 James Wilson of Penn-
sylvania responded to these objections by noting that the proposal pro-
hibited "retrospective interferences only." 8
After this exchange, a motion forbidding states from passing "bills
of Attainder or retrospective laws" was introduced and passed. By this
wording, the convention delegates sought to expand the previous prohibi-
tion against retrospective criminal laws-which had been accomplished
by the prohibition against ex post facto laws-to all laws, criminal and
civil.z 9 However, the Committee on Style changed the Clause to read,
Id. at 440.
26. Id. at 439.
27. In full, Colonel Mason stated: "This is carrying the restraint too far. Cases will hap-
pen that can not be foreseen, where some kind of interference will be proper, & essential-He
mentioned the case of limiting the period for bringing actions on open account .. " Id.
28. Id. Madison queried: "Is not that already done by the prohibition of ex post facto
laws, which will oblige the Judges to declare such interferences null and void." Id. The an-
swer to Madison's query was suggested on August 29, 1787 by Dickinson who read from
Blackstone to prove that this prohibition applied only to criminal legislation. Id. at 448.
29. Some have argued that the Ex Post Facto Clause was intended to prohibit retrospec-
tive civil laws as well as retrospective criminal laws. See, e.g., 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITIcs AND
THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 324-51 (1953). If this interpre-
tation were correct, the Contract Clause would have to be given prospective effect, or it would
be rendered superfluous. The Court's seminal decision in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386
(1798), squarely rejected this view of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Moreover, the two state con-
stitutions that were written before the Federal Constitution and use the term ex post facto to
make it clear that the prohibition against ex post facto laws in American constitutionalism
referred to criminal laws. See North Carolina Declaration of Rights § 24 (1776), reprinted in 5
F. THORPE, THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND
OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES Now OR HERETO-
FORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2788 (1909) ("That retrospective laws,
punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by them only declared crimi-
nal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; wherefore no ex post facto law ought
to be made."); Maryland Declaration of Rights § 15 (1776), reprinted in 3 F. THORPE, supra,
at 1688 (same wording of clause). When New Hampshire wanted to prohibit all retrospective
laws, criminal and civil, it eschewed the phrase ex post facto and used the general phrase
"retrospective." See New Hampshire Constitution § 23 (1784), reprinted in 4 F. THORPE,
supra, at 2456 ("Retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws,
therefore, should be made, either for decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offences.").
Moreover, The Federalist Papers also reflect an understanding that the Ex Post Facto Clause
was a protection against the operation of criminal law. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 577
(A. Hamilton) (Modem Library ed. 1961).
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"No state shall pass any bill of attainder, nor ex post facto laws, nor laws
altering or impairing the obligation of contracts," and subsequently de-
leted the predicate "altering. '30 Because of these changes the Clause
closely resembled a shortened version of the language from the North-
west Ordinance referenced by King.31
The Contract Clause did not occasion much debate in the ratifica-
tion process, but what debate there was confirms that the purpose of the
clause was to prohibit retrospective legislation interfering with contrac-
tual rights. In the one extended discussion of the Clause in The Federal-
ist, Madison emphasized that the Clause was designed to prevent
property rights from being displaced by legislation "contrary to the first
principles of the social compact and to every principle of sound legisla-
tion."' 32 Madison specifically linked the Clause to the prohibition against
ex post facto laws, which again suggests that the "first principles" he
mentioned were those required by a concept of the rule of law, similar to
Locke's, which held that property rights and liberty interests could be
dissolved only by prospective laws of general applicability.
The one extended discussion of the Contract Clause from those
opposed to the ratification of the Constitution emphasized its an-
30. The present wording provides: "No State shall... pass any... Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
31. We can only speculate at the reason for the Committee's changes but, as suggested
earlier, one difficulty in a prohibition against all retrospective laws is its breadth. Almost all
laws operate retrospectively in that they may defeat the expectations of those who planned
conduct with respect to existing laws. By casting the prohibition against retrospective laws in
terms of the specific matters of criminal prosecution-the Ex Post Facto Clause-and interfer-
ences with pre-existing contractual rights-the Contract Clause-the Framers created provi-
sions capable of judicial application.
32. Madison's full discussion was as follows:
Bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts,
are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of
sound legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the declarations
prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all of them are prohibited by the
spirit and scope of these fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us,
nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought not to be omitted.
Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in
favor of personal security and private rights; and I am much deceived if they have
not, in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the undoubted
interests of their constituents. The sober people of America are weary of the fluctuat-
ing policy which has directed the public councils. They have seen with regret and
indignation that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases affecting per-
sonal rights, become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and
snares to the more-industrious and less-informed part of the community. They have
seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the first link of a long chain of repeti-
tions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the
preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting,
which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence and
industry, and give a regular course to the business of society.
THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 291 (J. Madison) (Modem Library ed. 1961).
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timajoritarian nature and the concerns noted by those who opposed the
Clause at the Convention. 3 Luther Martin complained that the Clause
would prevent the states from passing legislation in times of crisis. He
particularly objected to the Clause's implicit prohibition of debtor relief
legislation, common at the time, that either prevented courts from en-
forcing foreclosures or authorized courts to defer payments. Such relief
legislation, Martin argued, was necessary to prevent "monied [men] from
totally destroying the poor though even industrious debtor."34
Some have contended that Martin's remarks demonstrate that the
Contract Clause was aimed solely or principally at state debtor relief leg-
islation. State debtor relief legislation, to be sure, was passed during
the economically troubled period between the end of the Revolution and
the framing of the Constitution. 6 Therefore, there is little doubt that
such legislation was one of the major evils that the Clause was designed
to eradicate.
The Clause, however, is framed in general terms and nowhere men-
tions debtor relief legislation. Moreover, the debtor relief theory of the
Clause has little support from the history of the Convention or ratifica-
33. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
34. Mr. Martin's discussion of the Contract Clause was as follows:
I considered, Sir, that there might be times of such great public calamities and dis-
tress, and of such extreme scarcity of specie as should render it the duty of a govern-
ment, for the preservation of even the most valuable part of its citizens in some
measure to interfere in their favour, by passing laws totally or partially stopping the
courts of justice, or authorizing the debtor to pay by installments, or by delivering up
his property to his creditors at a reasonable and honest valuation. The times have
been such as to render regulations of this kind necessary in most, or all of the States,
to prevent the wealthy creditor and the monied man from totally destroying the poor
though even industrious debtor - - Such times may again arrive. I therefore voted
against depriving the States of this power, a power which I am decided they ought to
possess, but which I admit ought only to be exercised on very important and urgent
occasions. I apprehend, Sir, the principal cause of complaint among the people at
large is, the public and private debt with which they are oppressed, and which, in the
present scarcity of cash, threatens them with destruction, unless they can obtain so
much indulgence in point of time that by industry and frugality they may extricate
themselves.
Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland, (1788), reprinted in 2
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 4.64-.65 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (emphasis in original).
35. Adherents of this theory generally argue that the prohibition is closely related to the
constitutional prohibition against the states' maintenance of their own currency and simply
represents an attempt by the Framers to protect a national free market from restrictions im-
posed by the states. As a recent commentator has stated, "[t]he economic nationalism ap-
proach portrays the Contract Clause as a limitation on the states' power to attack economic
powers on the national level." Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, supra note 13, at 1421.
See 1 W. CROSSKEY, supra note 29, at 352-60.
36. For a discussion of legislation favoring debtors, see J. FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD
OF AMERICAN HISTORY 193-96, 204-09 (1899). For a survey of such legislation, see A. NEV-
INS, THE AMERICAN STATES AFTER THE REVOLUTION, 1775-1789 at 457, 523, 537, 549, 570-
71 (1924).
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tion proceedings. At the Convention, the Clause was modeled on a pro-
vision in the Northwest Ordinance intended to protect property and
contract rights from the kind of retrospective legislation which the Fram-
ers believed was contrary to the rule of law.37 Moreover, in The Federal-
ist, Madison viewed the Clause as a "bulwark in favor of... private
rights" against improper legislation generally.38 Thus, the history of the
Clause suggests that it was aimed at all retrospective, redistributive
schemes in violation of vested contractual rights, of which debtor relief
was merely a prime example.
III. The History of the Contract Clause in the Supreme Court
The history of the Contract Clause in the Supreme Court can be
divided into four periods. In the first period, which lasted through the
late 1880's, the Supreme Court vigorously applied the Clause to strike
down state legislation that retrospectively impaired or altered contrac-
tual rights, whether these rights were held against other private individu-
als or against the state itself.
In the second period, which began after the Civil War and lasted
until the 1930's, the Contract Clause largely fell into disuse. The rise of
substantive due process enabled proponents of laissez-faire to argue suc-
cessfully for the invalidation of prospective as well as retrospective eco-
nomic legislation, thereby rendering the Contract Clause largely
superfluous.
In the third period, which began in 1934 with the Court's decision in
Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,39 the standard of review
for substantive due process analysis continued to be applied to cases
under the Contract Clause. However, as the due process standard be-
came very relaxed, the Contract Clause was rendered a virtual nullity.
In the final period, the modem Court has undertaken to revive the
Clause to a limited extent and has subjected to greater scrutiny a state's
retrospective interference with core contractual expectations. These re-
cent decisions, however, have not been informed by a coherent jurispru-
dence and by no means have restored the Clause to its original
importance.
37. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
38. THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 291 (J. Madison) (Modern Library ed. 1961).
39. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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A. The Early Decisions
For the first eighty years, the Contract Clause appears to have gen-
erated more Supreme Court cases than any other constitutional provi-
sion-reflecting the original importance of the Clause.40 The first
significant Supreme Court opinion interpreting the Contract Clause was
Fletcher v. Peck.41 The case reflected three broad themes of contract
clause analysis in the Marshall Court: (1) the application of the Clause to
public as well as private contracts; (2) the broad construction of the term
"contract" in the Clause; and (3) the near absolute prohibition of impair-
ments of contracts.
The issue in Fletcher was whether the Georgia Legislature could re-
voke a land grant made by a previous legislature. Chief Justice Marshall
relied generally on the text of the Constitution to defend the proposition
that the Contract Clause applied to contracts between the state and a
private party as well as to contracts between private parties. He asserted
that the words of the Contract Clause are "general, and are applicable to
contracts of every description."' 2 Second, in deciding that the land grant
was a contract, Marshall reasoned simply that "[a] grant is a contract
executed, and it creates also an implied executory contract, which is, that
the grantee shall continue to enjoy the thing granted according to the
terms of the grant."43 Finally, the Court viewed the Clause's prohibition
as virtually absolute. Those seeking to support the abrogation of the
grant argued that revocation was justified because the grant had been
tainted with fraud, but this argument proved unavailing.'
In 1819, the Court had the opportunity to continue its broad con-
struction of the Clause in two cases: Sturges v. Crowninshield45 and
Dartmouth College v. Woodward." In Sturges, the Court invalidated a
New York bankruptcy law which discharged a debt owing on a contract
40. For a comprehensive discussion of all contract clause cases decided in the Supreme
Court under Chief Justices Marshall and Taney, see B. WRIGHT, supra note 20, at 51-88.
41. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
42. Id. at 137.
43. Id. at 123.
44. Id. at 133-34. Another characteristic of early contract clause jurisprudence was its
tendency to vacillate between an analysis which was narrowly premised upon the text of the
Constitution and a mode of analysis based on the less determinant contours of natural law.
Although Marshall relied on the Contract Clause in Fletcher, he also speculated that the legis-
lation might be invalid because of natural law: "It may well be doubted whether the nature of
society and of government does not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any
be prescribed, where are they to be found, if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly
acquired, may be seized without compensation." Id. at 135.
45. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
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made before the law was passed. First, the Court rejected the creditor's
claim that New York lacked the power to pass any bankruptcy laws be-
cause Congress' power over bankruptcy was exclusive.47 The Court then
held that the Contract Clause rendered the statute unconstitutional as
applied to debts incurred before its passage."a In rejecting the contention
that the Clause was merely intended to prevent laws that permitted debt-
ors to pay their previous debts in installments, Chief Justice Marshall
again emphasized the general language of the Clause:
No men would use terms embracing a whole class of laws, for the
purpose of designating a single individual of that class. No Court
can be justified in restricting such comprehensive words to a partic-
ular mischief to which no allusion is made.... The Convention
appears to have intended to establish a great principle, that con-
tracts should be inviolable.49
The Sturges Court ignored arguments that the Clause should not
apply to statutes which had a legitimate state purpose-in this case relief
for the poor from the oppression of debts. In modem terminology, retro-
spective debtor relief was not justified by the state's interest in promoting
the general welfare.50 The Court's decision in this respect was supported
not only by the absolute language of the Clause but also by the history
surrounding its inclusion in the Constitution. As discussed above,51 the
Clause was passed against the background of the debtor relief legislation
that sought to advance, by abrogating contractual rights, what was per-
47. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 196.
48. Id. at 199, 207. Until its decision in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934), the Court continued to invalidate almost all debtor relief statutes that operated on
debts incurred before their passage, whether these statutes took the form of preventing a credi-
tor from selling assets at prices lower than assessed value, or of providing the debtor with more
time to redeem property seized for debt. See Howard v. Bugbee, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 461 (1860)
(invalidating Alabama statute that authorized a judgment creditor of a mortgagor to redeem
the property on paying the purchase price, the interest, and charges for a two year period after
the foreclosure sale); Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843) (invalidating law that
provided that no judicial sales should be made unless two-thirds of the appraised value was bid
for property).
The Court did, however, sustain statutes liberating debtors from prison, even if their debts
were incurred before the passage of the statute. See Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370,
378 (1827) ("Such laws act merely upon the remedy and that in part only. They do not take
away the entire remedy, but only so far as imprisonment forms a part of the remedy."). The
Court's doctrine that a change in remedies was not necessarily an impairment did not greatly
circumscribe the Contract Clause, for the Court was vigilant in striking down any scheme that
directly delayed or reduced payment to the creditor, even if it could be characterized as a
remedy.
49. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 205-06.
50. Hunter, the attorney for the debtor, argued to no avail that the statute be upheld in
light of the states' "natural, inherent, and indispensable power, of discharging poverty, dis-
tress, and absolute indigence and inability, from payment." Id. at 156.
51. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
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ceived to be the general welfare. Moreover, Luther Martin had specifi-
cally argued that the Clause interfered with the majority's ability to
promote the general welfare by protecting the rich against the poor. Yet
the Contract Clause was included in the Constitution in the face of such
objections.
In the second case, Dartmouth College v. Woodward,5 2 the issue was
whether New Hampshire had violated the Contract Clause by enacting
legislation that: (1) changed the College's charter to increase the Board
of Trustees from twelve to twenty-one members; (2) vested power of ap-
pointment of the new members in the governor; and (3) provided for a
Board of Overseers with veto power over the acts of the Trustees. The
Court first addressed the question of whether the Charter was a contract.
Chief Justice Marshall answered in the affirmative, reasoning that prop-
erty had been conveyed for a charitable purpose in exchange for the
Charter.13 To the argument that the Framers did not contemplate the use
of the Clause in such a situation, Marshall responded:
It is not enough to say, that this particular case was not in the
mind of the Convention when the article was framed, nor of the
American people, when it was adopted. It is necessary to go far-
ther and to say that, had this particular case been suggested, the
language would have been so varied, as to exclude it, or it would
have been made a special exception. 4
Chief Justice Marshall also rejected the argument of counsel that the
contract was not impaired, because the number of Trustees appointed
according to its original terms remained unchanged and the legislature
had merely added additional terms to the Charter, including a provision
for additional Trustees." Marshall interpreted the word "impair" in the
Contract Clause as equivalent to "alter."56
Marshall's only defeat in arguing for a broad protection of contracts
was in Ogden v. Saunders.57 In Ogden, the Court held that states may
enact laws affecting contracts so long as these laws operate prospectively.
Marshall argued that the right to contract is a natural right protected by
the Contract Clause; therefore, any law that interferes with the right to
contract, whether it operates prospectively or retrospectively,5" violates
52. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
53. Id. at 631-650.
54. Id. at 644.
55. Id. at 603, 610.
56. Id. at 651 ("By this contract the crown was bound, and could have made no violent
alteration in its essential terms, without impairing its obligation.").
57. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
58. See id. at 346-47. Marshall declared that "individuals do not derive from government
their right to contract, but bring that right with them into society .. " Therefore for Mar-
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the Clause. The majority, however, held that the Clause refers to con-
tractual obligations as they were created through the operation of posi-
tive law at the time of the contract. Under this view, only laws that
retrospectively alter obligations incurred under prior law would violate
the Clause.59 In support of their argument, the Justices in the majority
relied on the original intent of the Clause as it is implicit in the structure
of the Constitution. Justice Johnson contended that by classing together
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the obligation of
contracts, the Framers made clear that they were creating a "general
provision against arbitrary and tyrannical legislation over existing rights,
whether of person or property."'  Thus, an appeal to the original under-
standing of the Clause as an affirmation of the rule of law was crucial in
limiting its scope. In Ogden, the Court correctly saw the Clause as a
protection against retrospective legislation only, and ultimately rejected
the natural rights construction of the Clause that might have ushered in
substantive due process years before the Lochner era.6
This first period of Contract Clause interpretation was largely faith-
ful to the intent of the Clause. The Marshall Court correctly resisted the
argument that a Clause framed in general terms should only be applied
to particular kinds of debtor relief legislation. The Court was also right
to interpret the word "impair" as the equivalent of "alter" in view of the
purpose of the Clause: a contract can be impaired by imposing addi-
tional or altered obligations on one party to the contract as well as by
releasing the other party from his obligations.62 Moreover, the Court
correctly rejected the argument that the state's compelling interest in ad-
vancing the welfare of some group-in modem terms the state's use of its
police power to advance the public welfare-justified contractual impair-
ments. It is clear from the arguments of both the opponents and propo-
nents of the Clause, that laws designed to advance the welfare of one
shall, the contractual "obligation is not conferred on contracts by positive law, but is intrinsic,
and is conferred by the act of the parties." Id. at 346.
59. The Justices in the majority believed that the law at the time of contract "whether...
written or unwritten,... is emphatically the law of the contract made within the State, and
must govern it throughout, wherever its performance is sought to be enforced." Id. at 259.
60. Id. at 286 (opinion of Johnson, J.) (emphasis added).
61. Under Chief Justice Marshall's view, the Court could have struck down under the
Contract Clause a law limiting the number of hours employees were permitted to work, if the
Court determined that employers had a natural right to contract with employees with respect
to working hours. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the court did strike down
state maximum hour legislation as violative of the Due Process Clause.
62. This reading is also supported by the wording of the provision of the Northwest Ordi-
nance on which the Clause was modeled and the wording of the Clause before final stylistic
changes were made. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
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group at the expense of vested contractual rights were the main target of
the Clause.
Nevertheless, the Marshall Court may have erred in its unduly
broad construction of the term "contract."63 Chief Justice Marshall's
attempt to subject all executed conveyances to scrutiny under the Con-
tract Clause through the bald assertion that a "grant is a contract exe-
cuted"" is theoretically problematic, and ultimately contrary to the
original understanding of the Clause. Marshall claimed that a convey-
ance contains an implied executory contract that the grantee shall con-
tinue to enjoy the subject matter according to the terms of the grant.
First, it is apparent that the grantor never made any such promise, and
hence, even though the law may constitute a redistribution of wealth be-
tween parties to a contract, it cannot truly be said to be a redistribution
at odds with the contractual terms. 5 Second, even assuming the parties
would have articulated such a promise had they thought of it, the Court
is remaking the contract for the parties. Such behavior is contrary to the
judicial role.
The Marshall Court also may have erred in expanding the definition
of contract to include instruments, like a corporate charter, that reflect
types of relationships between a state and its citizens fundamentally dif-
ferent from that represented by a contract. 6 Bona fide contracts for
goods and services between a state and its citizens are within the ambit of
the Clause.67 However, the Court's assertion that a contract is created
by a grant from the state of any charter, including a corporate charter,
confuses the state's prerogative as sovereign to establish the structures
that are appropriate for doing business in its territory with its proprietary
powers to contract, like any other entity, for goods or services from pri-
vate individuals. The Contract Clause should apply only to the latter
situation, because it is only when the state is acting as a proprietor and
receiving consideration that the compacts between the state and a private
63. See supra text accompanying notes 41-44 & 52-56.
64. Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 123.
65. Indeed, as a general matter, once property is conveyed the doctrine of merger by deed
may terminate the effect of previous promises not contained in the deed. See 6A R. POWELL
& P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY % 893 (1968).
66. For instance, in Dartmouth College, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the charter
for Dartmouth College was within the scope of the Clause. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 643-44.
67. A distinction between public and private contracts is unwarranted in view of the lack
of language limiting the application of the Clause to private contracts or similarly limiting
discussion at the Convention. Moreover, given that the overriding purpose of the Clause is to
protect rights of parties to a contract from retrospective interference, it does not make sense to
exclude from the ambit of the Clause rights that arise from bargains between the state and
private individuals. The state legislature, representing the majority, may often have an interest
in abrogating the contractual rights of a minority.
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individual are comparable to contracts.68 In its sovereign capacity, the
state's ability to reserve the right to amend or revoke a charter or privi-
lege is substantially without limit.69
B. Stone v. Mississippi and the State's Police Power
The distinction between the state's governmental and proprietary
powers is important to understanding another nineteenth century case
which is central to the second period of the Contract Clause's history. In
Stone v. Mississippi,70 the Court held that a state could amend a corpo-
rate charter to forbid the corporation from selling lottery tickets, despite
the fact that the charter had previously granted the corporation the right
to conduct lotteries. The Court's decision rested on two separate proposi-
tions, either of which, the Court indicated, would have been sufficient to
justify its holding. First, since a state legislature could not contract away
its power over health and morals, any attempt to do so was void and did
not create obligations under the Contract Clause.7" Second, the right to
conduct lotteries was not a property right but a privilege and therefore
not within the ambit of the rights protected by the Clause.72
Commentators have argued that this case represents the beginning
of the Contract Clause's decline.73 Specifically, by recognizing a police
power exception to the Clause, the decision in Stone paved the way for
the Court's subsequent decision in Home Building & Loan Association v.
Blaisdell.74 Once the concept of police power evolved in the twentieth
century to include the power to advance the public welfare through re-
distribution of resources, states could legitimately justify a wide variety
of retrospective contractual impairments under the theory advanced in
Stone.
While this theory accurately describes the way in which Stone has
been used to justify the contract clause jurisprudence in Blaisdell, the
68. A similar point is made in Note, A Procedural Approach, supra note 4, at 934-37. Of
course, it is not always easy to determine when a state is acting in its proprietary, as opposed to
its sovereign, capacity. See generally Kmiec & Diamond, New Federalism Is Not Enough: The
Privatization of Non-Public Goods, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 321 (1984).
69. See, e.g., Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1881).
70. 101 U.S. 814 (1879).
71. Id. at 819.
72. Id. at 821.
73. See e.g., B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189 (1972).
74. 290 U.S. 398 (1934). See generally supra text accompanying note 39, and supra note
48. In Blaisdell, discussed more fully infra notes 80-93, the court abandoned the original un-
derstanding of the Clause, upholding a type of debtor relief legislation that impaired contrac-
tual rights.
75. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1689, 1719-
20 (1984).
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holding in Stone does not inevitably lead to Blaisdell. Given the original
understanding of the Clause, it is certainly possible to believe that Stone
was correctly decided, while Blaisdell and other recent contract clause
cases are in error. First, Stone may be seen as essentially a correction of
the overly expansive reading of what constitutes a public contract. As
noted earlier, those cases in which the Marshall Court found a contract
between the state and a private party may have been cases in which the
state was exercising its sovereign power to order the affairs of its citizens
by granting or refusing to grant charters for certain activities. 6 The
Court in Stone was reaching for such a distinction when it stated that the
charter's grant of power to conduct lotteries was not a "property right"
but a privilege and thus not protected under the Contract Clause.7 7
Second, the Contract Clause arguably was not framed to restrict un-
duly the state's police power so long as police power is defined in a way
that does not result in the evisceration of the original intent of the
Clause. A ban on lotteries, unlike debtor relief, is not designed to redis-
tribute resources in violation of vested contractual rights, but to regulate
the morals of the state's citizens. The state's use of its police power to
realistically advance some health, safety, or morals interest is unlikely to
violate contractual rights in a manner which falls within the prohibition
of the Clause.78 However, once the scope of the police power is ex-
panded to encompass the state's interest in advancing the public welfare
(including the improvement of resource distribution), the invocation of
police power may often conflict with the original purpose of the Clause.
Thus, it is important to define the legitimate scope of the police power in
contract clause cases with reference to the original understanding of the
Clause rather than to define the Contract Clause by current thinking on
the scope of the police power.79
C. The Evisceration of the Contract Clause: Home Building & Loan
Association v. Blaisdell
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,8  the Court
76. See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 15 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 519 (1819).
77. 101 U.S. at 820.
78. For a discussion of the implications of our construction of the Contract Clause for
legislation aimed at externalities such as pollution, see infra notes 131-133 and accompanying
text.
79. For an effort to argue that the scope of police power generally should be construed
more narrowly than this under modem doctrine, see R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 93 (1985). For a similar limiting construction
in the context of land use law, see D. KMIEC, ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK, §§ 2-1 to
2-35 (1986).
80. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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turned the meaning of the Contract Clause on its head. Influenced by
the depression and the growing discontent with the jurisprudence of sub-
stantive due process,81 the Court adopted a very lenient standard of re-
view of debtor relief legislation, despite the fact that such legislation was
one of the principal evils which the Clause was designed to prohibit.
The Minnesota statute 2 in Blaisdell was not appreciably different
from the statutes the Court had invalidated consistently throughout the
nineteenth century. The statute provided that a mortgagor who was in
default but whose period for redemption of the property had not yet ex-
pired could apply to state court for an extension of the redemption pe-
riod. The Court required the petitioner to pay a reasonable rent for the
extension period and part of these payments could be applied to the in-
terest on the debts that the applicant owed. Pursuant to the statute, the
state court extended the redemption period for three years, from May 2,
1932 to May 1, 1935, and ordered Mr. Blaisdell to pay forty dollars a
month in rent.
Writing for a narrow majority of five Justices, Chief Justice Hughes
stated explicitly that the Court was not bound by the original under-
standing of the Clause. Rather, Hughes posited that the Court must con-
sider the case "'in the light of our whole experience and not merely in
that of what was said a hundred years ago,' ,'83 and that because of a
"growing recognition of public needs.., the reservation of the reason-
able exercise of the protective power of the State is read into all contracts
"84
81. For a discussion of popular criticism of the Supreme Court in the early 1930's, see M.
KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN
CULTURE 259 (1986).
82. 1933 Minn. Laws ch. 339.
83. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 443 (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)).
84. Id. at 443-44. The opinion in Blaisdell purported to find important support for its
holding in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837) and West
River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848), as well as Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S.
814 (1879). None of those authorities were particularly apposite. The principal holding in
Charles River Bridge was the rule that public contracts should be narrowly construed in favor
of the state. This holding can be seen as a reaction to the Marshall Court's overly expansive
view of what is a contract and, in any event, was not meant to govern review of private con-
tracts. West River Bridge Co. held under the reserved powers doctrine that a state could not
alienate through contract its powers of eminent domain. Therefore, the state has the right to
appropriate contractual rights, like other property rights, so long as just compensation is paid.
The state eminent domain power, unlike the power exercised in Blaisdell, is wholly consistent
with the purpose of the Contract Clause. No redistribution occurs because compensation is
paid for the voiding of vested contractual rights. We have already noted that in Stone v. Mis-
sissippi the legislation, unlike that at issue in Blaisdell, did not redistribute resources from one
party to another. See supra text accompanying notes 70-79.
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The Court upheld the statute in Blaisdell after finding that it met
five criteria. First, the Court noted that the statute was emergency legis-
lation passed in response to an economic crisis."5 Second, the Court
stated that the object of the legislation was the protection of "a basic
interest of society," not the "advantage of particular individuals."86 The
third and fourth criteria blended together to assert that the relief be
granted according to reasonable conditions because (1) the integrity of
the mortgage was not impaired, and (2) the mortgagor was required to
pay the mortgagee a reasonable rent for the period in which the redemp-
tion was extended. 7 Finally, the Court noted that the legislation was
temporary in operation.""
Justice Sutherland's dissent argued that the majority ignored the
original understanding of the Clause and embraced the arguments of
those who opposed the Clause at the Convention and in the ratification
debates. As noted above, one opponent, Luther Martin of Maryland,
had argued for the necessity of state power to address the condition of
the debtor, particularly in periods of economic crisis.89 However, the
Clause was framed immediately following a time in which debtor relief
laws were frequently passed in response to perceived economic emergen-
cies. Thus, the Clause was included in the Constitution to protect vested
contract rights precisely during those times of crisis in which the Blais-
dell Court would permit impairment. As Justice Sutherland stated,
"With due regard for.., logical thinking, it legitimately cannot be urged
that conditions which produced the rule may now be invoked to destroy
it."9 o
85. 290 U.S. at 444.
86. Id. at 445.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 447.
89. See supra note 34.
90. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 472 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). Justice Sutherland also sharply
attacked the majority's argument that the constitutional text should be reinterpreted in light of
experience. In a classic statement of a jurisprudence of original intent, he argued:
A provision of the Constitution, it is hardly necessary to say, does not admit of two
distinctly opposite interpretations. It does not mean one thing at one time and an
entirely different thing at another time. If the contract impairment clause, when
framed and adopted, meant that the terms of a contract for the payment of money
could not be altered in invitum by a state statute enacted for the relief of hardly
pressed debtors to the end and with the effect of postponing payment or enforcement
during and because of an economic or financial emergency, it is but to state the
obvious to say that it means the same now. This view, at once so rational in its
application to the written word, and so necessary to the stability of constitutional
principles, though from time to time challenged, has never, unless recently, been put
within the realm of doubt by the decisions of this court.
Id. at 448-49.
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The other criteria relied on by the majority are no more satisfactory
than the majority's invocation of an emergency. The argument that this
legislation advanced a basic public interest rather than a private interest
is unpersuasive. As we have seen, the debtor's attorney made the same
argument in Sturges v. Crowninshield,91 but it was not accepted by the
CoUrt.9 2
The Court's emphasis on the reasonableness of the conditions at-
tached to the legislation was also misplaced. The Court read the Clause
as if it stated: "No state shall pass any law unreasonably impairing the
obligation of contracts." The Framers, however, knew how to phrase
prohibitions in terms of reasonableness, as shown by the Fourth Amend-
ment's prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures." The
Contract Clause is phrased in absolute terms and is grouped with other
absolute prohibitions such as the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto
Clauses designed to protect the rule of law. Therefore, a contract clause
jurisprudence that adheres to the original understanding must either
strike down all retrospective impairments or, like first amendment juris-
prudence, create an exceedingly stringent standard of review that only
the most compelling demonstrations of necessity will satisfy.
More than anything else, Blaisdell shows the power of the Zeitgeist
to determine constitutional decisions even when those decisions are de-
monstrably at odds with any original understanding of the Constitution.
The legitimate attack on substantive due process erroneously led to a new
unified theory of the Constititution-that it never, or almost never, con-
strains economic legislation.9" The theory proceeded on the misappre-
hension that the Contract Clause, like substantive due process, was a
threat to representative government. To the contrary, the Contract
Clause, like the Bill of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Clauses, is designed
to protect minority factions from majority oppression by enforcing the
rule of law, and is thus consistent with the theory of representative gov-
ernment that the Framers held. Therefore, the vigor with which the
Clause is enforced should not have diminished with the demise of sub-
stantive due process.
D. Current Contract Clause Jurisprudence
The Court under former Chief Justice Burger revived the Contract
Clause to a limited extent by adopting a more stringent standard of re-
91. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
92. See supra note 50.
93. For a discussion of the reasons that substantive economic due process was attacked,
see infra notes 124-125 and accompanying text.
view for certain contractual impairments. As a result, the Court has,
invalidated statutes under the Clause for the first time since the late
1940's.94 The revival of the Clause, however, falls far short of restoring it
to the power it should enjoy, given the original intention of the Framers.
Moreover, the present Court's jurisprudence is at odds with the Framers'
interest in providing certainty to those who enter into contracts, because
in evaluating the constitutionality of an impairment the Court has
adopted widely differing standards of review and balanced the extent of
the impairment against the policy that the state seeks to advance. Based
on an ad hoc policy calculus, the Court's decisions are largely
unpredictable.
The Court's decision in United States Trust v. New Jersey 9 marks
the beginning of the most recent period of contract clause jurisprudence.
In that case, the states of New York and New Jersey had passed a bill
abrogating a provision of a covenant in a bond agreement. The provision
had limited the ability of the Port Authority, an interstate compact
agency, to subsidize passenger transportation from revenues which had
been pledged as securities to Port Authority bondholders.96 The purpose
of the abrogation was to permit the Port Authority to subsidize com-
muter rail services to a greater extent.9 7
Justice Blackmun's analysis began by suggesting that ordinarily
"[s]tates must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures
without being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even
destroyed, as a result."98 He described the proper standard of review of
legislation challenged under the Contract Clause as one which would up-
hold as constitutional impairments that are "reasonable and necessary to
serve an important public purpose." 99 Moreover, Justice Blackmun
noted that courts should defer to legislative judgments as to the reasona-
bleness of particular measures, as they defer in their due process review
of economic legislation."°° Thus, Justice Blackmun implied that in the
94. See Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust v.
New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
95. 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
96. This is clearly an example of a public contract in which the state is acting in its propri-
etary capacity, because the state is attempting to borrow money from private individuals. As
an inducement to the bondholders, the state has entered into a covenant to secure the revenues
from which interest on the bond is paid.
97. 431 U.S. at 14.
98. Id. at 22. Justice Blackmun denominates this power as "the reserved power doc-
trine." The doctrine states that a "reasonable exercise of the protective power of the State is
read into all contracts ..... " Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1937).
99. 431 U.S. at 25.
100. Id. at 22-23.
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usual case the standard of review will be very lenient. However, Justice
Blackmun then distinguished the usual case in which the contract im-
paired is between private parties, from the case in which the contract
impaired is one to which the state is a party. Although Justice Blackmun
believed that both private and public contracts should be reviewed under
the same formulation of "reasonable and necessary," he argued that the
standard should be applied with less deference in reviewing public con-
tracts because "the State's self-interest is at stake." 10 1 Justice Blackmun
then adopted a least restrictive alternative analysis of New Jersey's abro-
gation of the covenant."0 2 Because he concluded that a less drastic modi-
fication would have permitted the Port Authority to increase public
transportation without entirely abrogating the covenant, he held the state
legislation invalid.1"3
Each of the steps in Justice Blackmun's lengthy effort to establish
and apply a standard of review is open to criticism. First, in constructing
a test that seeks to determine which impairments are constitutional, the
Court ignores the plain language of the Contract Clause. According to
that language, once legislation is found to impair a contract it violates the
Clause. The structure of Justice Blackmun's test evinces a balancing ap-
proach that, at its foundation, is contrary to the absolute language of the
Clause.
Second, Justice Blackmun's phrasing of the standard of review as a
determination of whether the legislation impairing the contract is "rea-
sonable and necessary" to effectuate an important public purpose is both
curious and confusing. A reasonableness test is a fairly relaxed or mini-
mal standard of constitutional review while formulations employing ne-
cessity have been viewed as calling forth a more exacting standard."°
Justice Blackmun confuses the issue further when he suggests that in the
ordinary course the Court will defer to state determinations of what is
"reasonable and necessary." Such deference seems to collapse the stan-
101. Id. at 26. To support this distinction, Justice Blackmun argued that the scope of the
police power reserved to the state in contract clause cases has been determined under two
distinct analyses depending upon whether the contract is private or public. According to Jus-
tice Blackmun, in cases involving private contracts the relevant inquiry is what powers are
reserved by the state as a matter of law in construing any contract. See, e.g., Manigault v.
Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905). In public contracts, the initial inquiry is into whether the
state may bargain away the police power at issue or whether that power is "inalienable." See
Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 817 (1879). While the doctrines of "reserved powers" and
"inalienability" may indeed be nominally distinct, there has never been any suggestion that the
powers reserved are different from the powers inalienable. Certainly no case under either doc-
trine previously suggested that one standard of review is to be distinguished from another.
102. 431 U.S. at 28-32.
103. Id. at 30-32.
104. See id. at 54 & n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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dard of review, whatever the formulation, into the rational basis test for
economic legislation under the Due Process Clause and thus deprives the
Contract Clause of any independent force. Justice Blackmun's mixing of
standards demonstrates a schizophrenia that characterized the Burger
Court's approach to review under the Contract Clause: the Court
wanted to apply a stringent standard in order to respect the Constitu-
tion's expressed solicitude toward contractual rights, and to simultane-
ously keep the standard relaxed so that it would be consistent with the
relaxed standard that has come to characterize the Court's review of eco-
nomic legislation. These mutually inconsistent goals, fostered by an
assumed, but mistaken, identity between the concerns of substantive due
process and the Contract Clause, have created an incoherent juris-
prudence.
Justice Blackmun's attempt to raise the standard of review for legis-
lation which impairs public contracts above that for legislation which
impairs private contracts is also in error. First, a more stringent stan-
dard of review for public contracts is not supported by the text or history
of the Contract Clause. If anything, the Court's earlier jurisprudence has
been more, not less, deferential to public contracts insofar as the con-
tracts were more likely to implicate the police power or reserved author-
ity. Second, while the argument that the legislature's self-interest in
public contracts should lead to a stricter review has a certain, albeit delu-
sive, plausibility, it is fundamentally incorrect because the self-interest of
a state legislature passing economic or social legislation is, at bottom, no
different from the public interest. The state invokes the same justifica-
tions for modifying public contracts and private contracts-namely, that
the public welfare will be advanced by the alteration-and the alteration
should be reviewed under the same standard.105
The Court's opinion in United States Trust is almost Ptolemaic in
nature: that is, it represents a very complex, and ultimately incorrect,
theory to explain a result that on a true understanding of the Clause is
apparent. A state's abrogation of a bond covenant into which its port
authority expressly has entered to induce people to buy bonds voids a
contractual provision. The state's justification of the abrogation is con-
sciously redistributive; if the bondholders' contractual rights are sacri-
ficed the commuting public will be aided because the Port Authority can
subsidize more commuter railroads. Because the abrogation of the bond-
holders' covenant is retrospective and consciously redistributive, it is
contrary to the Contract Clause.
105. See Comment, Repeal of Municipal Bond Covenants, 91 HARv. L. REV. 83, 89-90
(1977).
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The Court's other recent contract clause decisions do not construct
such an elaborate standard of review, but more explicitly engage in bal-
ancing the state's interest in abrogating a term of the contract and the
contract holder's interest in maintaining its terms. In Allied Structural
Steel v. Spannaus, °6 the Court faced the issue of whether Minnesota
could order corporations with pension plans to pay pension benefits to
employees whose benefits had not yet vested under the terms of the con-
tract between the corporation and its employees. Writing for a five mem-
ber majority, Justice Stewart undertook a balancing approach to
determine whether this legislation could withstand scrutiny under the
Contract Clause. First, Justice Stewart assessed the severity of the con-
tract impairment, because, according to Justice Stewart, "[t]he severity
of the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legislation
must clear."' 07 Because the vesting provisions were a basic provision of
the pension plan agreed to by the corporation and its employees, and
because the company reasonably relied on these provisions in calculating
its annual contributions to the pension fund, the Court found a severe
impairment.'08 As for the state's interest in enacting the legislation, the
Court noted that whereas the mortgage moratorium legislation at issue in
Blaisdell had protected a broad societal interest, the pension vesting leg-
islation protected the interests of only a "narrow class" of employees.10 9
The legislation applied only to private employers who had at least 100
employees and who had established voluntary pension plans. Moreover,
the legislation was not enacted to deal with an economic emergency like
that which prompted the mortgage moratorium legislation in the 1930's.
Therefore, after balancing the state's interest in passing the legislation
and the company's interest in maintaining the terms of its contract, the
Court struck down the legislation.' 0
Allied Steel reached the correct result through unprincipled reason-
ing. Justice Stewart's test led to a different result from Blaisdell only
because the majority subjectively had assigned different weights to the
factors to be balanced. To be sure, the vesting provisions were central to
the contract between the corporation and its employees, but no more so
than foreclosure and redemption provisions were central to the mortgage
contract. While-it is true that no general economic emergency existed in
106. 438 U.S. 234 (1978).
107. Id. at 245.
108. Id. at 246.
109. Id. at 249.
110. Justice Stewart never explicitly stated that he was employing a balancing test but the
structure of the opinion-first evaluating the contract holders' interest and then the state's
interest--demonstrates that this is a fair characterization of his mode of analysis.
the mid-1970's, many experts believed that there was a crisis in pension
plan administration because employees were being denied the possibility
of a secure retirement by pension plans that raised false expectations of
benefits.' Finally, it is unclear why the state's interest in giving em-
ployees secure pension plans is less compelling than its interest in saving
their homes. It is true that there may be more people who have mort-
gages than who have pension plans of the kind at issue in Spannaus. Yet
an analysis that upholds legislation in proportion to the number of people
who will benefit by the impairment seems wholly contrary to the original
understanding of the Clause if we remember that debtor relief legisla-
tion-a primary target of the Clause-affected a very large group of peo-
ple, namely debtors. It also is contrary to the Clause's underlying
purpose: the protection of an isolated minority faction (those who stand
to benefit from the contract to be altered or abrogated) from majority
oppression. When the abrogation or modification of a contract will bene-
fit many people rather than just a few, majority oppression is more likely
and therefore the strictures of the Clause must be vigorously enforced.' 2
The lack of a principled approach to the Contract Clause was high-
lighted when the Court relaxed its standard of review to uphold an im-
pairment of contract in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton."3 In Exxon, the
Supreme Court refused to invalidate Alabama legislation that prevented
a producer of oil and natural gas from passing on increases in a sever-
ance tax to buyers in bulk of natural gas, according to explicit contrac-
11. The perception of this crisis was so widespread that it led to the passage of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829. See H. Rep.
127, 1st Sess. 1, 7-8 (1973) (provisions of ERISA are "addressed to the issue of whether work-
ing men and women shall receive private pension plan benefits which they have been led to
believe would have been theirs upon retirement from working lives").
112. In Note, Rediscovering the Contract Clause, supra note 13, at 1426-28, the author
argues that the approach in Allied Steel is consistent with an understanding of the Contract
Clause as an attempt to protect the rule of law or what the writer terms "institutional regular-
ity." The argument seems to depend on the proposition that legislation impairing contracts
offends the rule of law in proportion as it favors or disfavors an identifiable class. This proposi-
tion, in turn, is derived from the ideal of generality in the rule of law.
This theory of the Contract Clause is open to question as a matter of original understand-
ing and would be impossible to apply in any principled manner. First, while generality is an
ideal of the rule of law, the legislation's generality does not ameliorate its retrospectivity. The
Bill of Attainder Clause, for instance, was included in the Constitution to protect against laws
of improper specificity, but the history of the Contract Clause strongly suggests that the Clause
was intended to protect contracts against retrospective legislation regardless of the legislation's
generality. Moreover, it is difficult to understand how the decisions under the Contract Clause
can turn on the issue whether those helped or hurt by an impairment form an identifiable class.
Contractual impairments by their very nature affect identifiable classes- those who are parties
to the contracts impaired.
113. 462 U.S. 176 (1983).
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tual terms permitting the seller to pass on the tax. The Court rested its
holding on two propositions. First, it distinguished its holding in Allied
Steel, finding that the Alabama legislation in Exxon was motivated by a
broad local interest-that of preventing consumers from paying excessive
prices.' 14 Second, the Court seemed to suggest that this legislation did
not violate core expectations of the parties to the contract because the
states have always enjoyed plenary power to set rates, particularly in reg-
ulated industries such as natural gas. Therefore, the Court concluded
that if a party is not immune from regulation of rates, it is not immune
from state legislation regulating the incidence of a tax on a preexisting
contract. 115
Once again, the Court manipulated its standard of review and
weighted its balances in order to reach the desired result. First, the stan-
dard was formulated far differently from the one articulated in United
States Trust, in which the Court required impairments to be both reason-
able and necessary. Second, the Court's distinction of Allied Steel on the
ground that the Alabama legislation in Exxon served a broader interest
than the pension plan legislation is not compelling. It is wholly unclear
on what basis a court is to decide whether a state's interest in protecting
a worker's retirement security is less important than protecting consum-
ers from higher prices. Of course, it is true that the interest is broader in
that there are more oil consumers than those covered by pension plans,
but, as already suggested, gauging the number of those who are aided or
hurt by the impairment is an unprincipled guide to whether the impair-
ment is constitutional.
Finally, the Court's reliance on a state's ability to set prices in a
heavily regulated and monopolistic industry like utilities does not serve
as a compelling precedent for the state to regulate the incidence of sever-
ance tax among those in the chain of distribution of a particular com-
modity. In other words, the government has made clear that because
utility rates will be set by regulation, utility companies do not possess a
contractual right to receive a particular price. Both on account of the
monopolistic structure of utility companies and because of the tradition
of regulation, it may be possible to argue that utility companies are on
notice that prices to consumers may be regulated even in contravention
of a contract. The fact that the state government sets utility rates, how-
ever, does not imply that those who have contracted to determine the
incidence of a tax are on notice that they do not possess contractual
114. Id. at 191-92.
115. Id. at 194.
rights under positive law."1 6
A more principled approach to the contractual impairments faced
by the Court in Allied Steel and Exxon would have eschewed manipula-
tion of standards and weighted scales. In Allied Steel, the Court should
have observed that the corporation and its employees had obviously
agreed on a pension plan between themselves. They had bargained for
contractual provisions which, inter alia, set out periods in which the pen-
sions were to vest. By requiring the company to pay pensions to employ-
ees who were not qualified under this plan, the state was impairing a
specific provision of the bargain. Moreover, the legislation could not be
justified by reference to a concept of police power consistent with the
original understanding of the Contract Clause, because the legislation
was frankly redistributive. Therefore, the retrospective effect of the pen-
sion legislation in Allied Steel was inconsistent with the Contract Clause.
Similarly, the legislation in Exxon altered a specific provision of the con-
tract between buyer and seller of natural gas and oil. The legislation
cannot be justified by a concept of police power that is consistent with
the Contract Clause 7 nor do other justifications exist, as the state had
never explicitly or by tradition reserved to itself the power to revise con-
tracts by determining where the incidence of a tax falls. Therefore, the
abrogation of the pass-through provisions should have been invalidated
under the Contract Clause.
In Keystone Bituminious Coal Association v. DeBenedictus, 118 a case
decided just this Term, the Court has signalled that it will continue to
adhere to its unprincipled contract clause jurisprudence. In that case,
mine owners who had contracted with surface owners to waive liability
for surface damage challenged under the contract clause legislation
which prohibited the licensing of mine owners unless they repaired all
subsidence damage which their mining had caused to surface lands."1 9
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, summarily rejected the challenge,
first observing without explanation that, unlike all the other prohibitions
imposed on the states by article I, section 10 of the Constitution, "it is
well-settled that the prohibition against impairing the obligation of con-
tracts is not to be read literally."1 20 Accordingly, the Court held that
116. Similar criticism may be levied against Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power
& Light Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983), in which the Court refused to strike down legislation which
abrogated price redetermination clauses in a contract between a utility and supplier of natural
gas.
117. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
118. 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987).
119. The mine owners also brought a challenge under the Takings Clause. Id. at 1236.
120. Id. at 1251.
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although the statute was a contractual impairment, it was justified by the
"strong public interest in preventing [subsidence damage caused by min-
ing], the environmental effect of which transcend[s] any private agree-
ment between contracting parties." '' The Court also continued to
employ a confused standard to evaluate the state's asserted justification
of the impairment, first arguing that a court must itself scrutinize
whether the legislature's action was appropriate in light of its purpose,
and then stating, one sentence later, that the courts should defer to the
legislature's judgment as to the necessity of its action.1 22
Keystone demonstrates that the Court believes it can now dispose of
a serious contract clause claim in a few conclusory paragraphs without
even discussing its own inconsistent standards of review. 23 Thus, the
revival of the Contract Clause, which began with United States Trust and
Allied Steel, appears to have ended, in large measure because these cases
failed to rediscover the original understanding of the Clause. A return to
the original understanding, we believe, would provide a coherent juris-
prudence for contract clause cases.
IV. Possible Criticism of the Original Understanding
In brief, an accurate construction of the Contract Clause would in-
validate retrospective, not prospective, laws which are redistributive in
violation of vested contractual rights. A revival of the original under-
standing of the Contract Clause may be challenged as a return to sub-
stantive due process analysis. As alluded to earlier and more fully
discussed below, we believe this challenge to be baseless. The proposed
construction may also be criticized both for its breadth and its narrow-
ness. Those criticizing its breadth will likely argue that the interpreta-
tion we suggest renders the operation of the modem welfare and
regulatory state difficult, if not impossible. On the other hand, those crit-
icizing its narrowness may contend that our refusal to apply the Clause
to prospective legislation insufficiently protects economic liberties. We
will briefly address each of these possible criticisms.
A. Substantive Due Process
To equate the original understanding of the Contract Clause to sub-
stantive due process is to misunderstand both concepts. To see why this
is so, it is useful to summarize why substantive due process, particularly
121. Id. at 1252.
122. Id. at 1253.
123. For a discussion of the proper resolution of the facts presented by Keystone, see infra
text accompanying notes 134-135.
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as it relates to the judicial invalidation of social and economic legislation,
has been fairly criticized. There are three main lines of criticism which,
although interrelated, may be separately stated. First, substantive due
process has little or no historical basis. There is little evidence that the
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to give courts the right
to invalidate social and economic legislation because of perceived inter-
ference with some set of economic theories. 24 Second, because it rests
on no demonstrable textual or historical principle of the Constitution,
substantive due process results in an unprincipled jurisprudence in which
the Court upholds or overturns economic and social legislation on the
basis of an unpredictable policy calculus of the reasonableness of the leg-
islation's interference with economic liberty. 2 ' Third, substantive due
process is undemocratic because it permits unelected judges to overturn
the decisions of the people's representatives on essential matters of social
and economic policy.
The construction of the Contract Clause posited here suffers from
none of these defects. First, it has substantial support in the history of
the Clause. Second, the construction asserted, unlike that currently em-
ployed by the Court, eschews ad hoc balancing by invalidating all legisla-
tion that retrospectively alters the terms of an existing bargain between
contracting parties in an attempt to redistribute resources. Third, this
interpretation is consistent with the concept of democracy that the Fram-
ers actually possessed-a democracy constrained by the rule of law. 126
B. Inconsistency with the Modern Regulatory and Welfare State
Even though the Framers' theory of the Clause may be distin-
guished from substantive due process, some may argue that it gives too
much protection to economic interests to be consistent with the modern
regulatory and welfare state. Without passing judgment on the validity
of the premise underlying this position-namely, that constitutional pro-
visions should be accommodated to the form of government currently
perceived as necessary or desirable notwithstanding the ascertainable
meaning of these provisions-we believe that the original understanding
124. For a discussion of the original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment, see R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 193-220 (1977). The classic statement of the Four-
teenth Amendment's agnosticism toward competing economic theories is Justice Holmes' dic-
tum, "[t]he 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statistics."
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
125. For a discussion of the reasons substantive due process leads to unprincipled judicial
decisionmaking, see Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
L.J. 6-15 (1971).
126. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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of the Contract Clause does not render the modem regulatory and wel-
fare state impossible.
To be sure, under the interpretation of the Contract Clause dis-
cussed here, state and local legislatures would be disabled from passing
laws that modified contracts between parties in the interest of helping
one party to the contract at the expense of the other. '27 Thus, some
modem legislation presently upheld by federal courts would be invalid
under the original interpretation of the Clause. For instance, a federal
court recently upheld the application to existing dealership contracts of a
state law requiring that a dealer be given a six month opportunity to cure
performance before cancellation for poor performance. 12 Such an appli-
cation clearly violates the Contract Clause because under the law at the
time of acceptance of the contract, manufacturers could terminate their
contracts with dealers at will unless other terms were specified in the
contract. Similarly, a local law retrospectively giving a tenant rights not
contained in his or her lease, such as the right to remain a tenant after
the building is converted into a condominium, would be unconstitu-
tional. '29 This interpretation of the Clause would also generally prevent
the retroactive application of rent controls.
States and localities would not be permanently prevented from ap-
plying such legislation, however, because under the interpretation pos-
ited, states and localities remain at liberty to apply prospectively all the
laws in the examples cited above. This interpretation does not forbid
changes in any social institution, whether pertaining to marketing distri-
bution, rental housing, or other subjects, if such changes are perceived to
be required by social needs. If a legislature believes that such changes are
needed immediately, nothing in the interpretation suggested prevents the
legislature from buying out contractual obligations under its eminent do-
main power so that the cost of voiding the obligation is borne by the
community as a whole rather than by those who stand to benefit from the
obligations voided. 3' Moreover, our interpretation of the Clause does
127. The legislation need not display a specific intent to redistribute before it should be
deemed to violate the Contract Clause. If the necessary consequence of the legislation is to
redistribute resources between parties to a contract, an intent to redistribute may be inferred
and the legislation should be subject to strict scrutiny under the Contract Clause.
128. See N.A. Burkitt, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 597 F. Supp. 1086 (D. Me. 1984).
129. See Troy Ltd. v. Renna, 727 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1984) (upholding against a contract
clause challenge a tenancy act which retrospectively conferred on citizens over sixty years of
age special rights with respect to evictions upon condominium conversions).
130. In addition, not all retrospective laws are prohibited; only those that impair contrac-
tual rights actually violate the Clause. For example, a recent California law requires that the
owner of fine art pay five percent of any resale amount to the artist from whom he bought the
work. See Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 983 (1980). As
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not forbid regulations aimed at economic externalities even if the legisla-
tion has the incidental effect of rendering contractual performance more
difficult or even impossible. 13 1 For instance, consider legislation that re-
quires the use of pollution controls on widget factories. Because of the
introduction of pollution controls, the widget manufacturer may lose
money on his or her outstanding contracts to widget buyers. Neverthe-
less, this legislation violates neither the letter nor spirit of the Contract
Clause. It is not the necessary consequence of the legislation that the
widget manufacturer, rather than the widget buyer, bears the added cost
of pollution controls; the manufacturer and buyer could have contractu-
ally agreed to have the manufacturer pass the costs on to the buyer. Ac-
cordingly, the manufacturer suffers a loss not because of the impairment
of the contractual obligation, but by operation of the contract. 132 Nor
does legislation exclusively aimed at externalities generally have the ef-
fect of conferring a benefit on one party to the contract at the expense of
another: the widget buyer, unlike the failing dealer or tenant in our pre-
vious examples, does not directly gain from the imposition of pollution
controls. For this reason, legislation aimed at externalities is unlikely to
be of the kind that Madison believed the Contract Clause was designed to
prevent- that is, legislation produced by a faction interested in interfer-
ing with contractual obligations for its own benefit. 33
we have earlier rejected Chief Justice Marshall's attempt in Fletcher v. Peck to convert prop-
erty rights into contract rights by finding implied promises in contracts that have already
terminated, see supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text, the California law would not appear
to be a contractual impairment. After the "objet d'art" has changed hands, the law is better
understood as an impairment of a property, rather than a contract, right. If state regulation
like that suggested by the California law is to be constrained, the proper judicial focus would
be a takings analysis, either under the state constitution or under those federal taking princi-
ples which have been incorporated by the Court as part of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.
131. An externality is the social cost of an activity that the market's pricing system fails to
include in the price of the activity, because the transaction costs of bargaining over the owner-
ship of the rights affected by the activity exceed the social costs the activity imposes. See
generally Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960). For instance, the trans-
action costs of reaching an agreement between a polluter and those who may be harmed by the
polluter's activity would be very high. Retrospective legislation addressed to the problem of
externalities will not necessarily violate the Contract Clause because by hypothesis externali-
ties are caused by an inability of parties to allocate costs through contractual arrangements.
132. This example also makes clear the reasons that legislation interfering with the alloca-
tion of the costs of regulation, such as the legislation at issue in Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462
U.S. 176 (1983), violates the Contract Clause. Because the Contract Clause was designed to
permit people to plan for the future through their ability to create vested rights, legislation that
invalidates the allocation of costs of unexpected legislative action makes a mockery of the
contract clause promise of a safe harbor against the unpredictable will of the legislature.
133. Of course, regulation ostensibly designed to internalize externalities can be employed
through manipulation or capture of the regulatory or legislative process by one competing
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Of course, like all useful interpretations of constitutional clauses,
this interpretation of the Contract Clause will not avoid hard cases. For
instance, consider state legislation requiring that when coal mine opera-
tors reduce the value of surface land above their mines they must restore
the land to the extent technologically feasible. The state claims that this
legislation is needed to protect the state's interest in the environment. 134
Previously, mine operators bought mineral rights from a large number of
landowners and, as part of these transactions, the landowners also
waived any right to damages that the mining would cause to their sur-
face. Does this legislation, as applied to land with respect to which such
contractual waivers exist, violate the Contract Clause? On the one hand,
the natural consequence of the legislation, unlike that in the pollution-
widget example above, seems to be to redistribute resources from the
mine operators to the landowners in contravention of vested rights. On
the other hand, however, the state's purported justification is that the
legislation is designed to protect the ostensible rights of third parties-
the people of the state-to enjoy the environment.
The difficulty stems from the fact that there is a direct correlation
between the public good that the state seeks to protect-the environ-
ment-and the private right that the landowner has bargained away-
the right to avoid damage to the land's surface. To protect the public
good is to abrogate the landowner's contractual waiver. Despite the so-
cial justification for the legislation, the landowner is the beneficiary of the
wealth redistribution. One traditional mode of analysis that the judiciary
employs to ensure that legislation passed for an ostensibly legitimate pur-
pose does not encroach on constitutional rights is the least restrictive
alternative analysis.135 This approach may be appropriate here. By re-
party to disadvantage another. For example, one way natural gas companies may augment
business is to portray a competing fuel like high-sulphur coal as environmentally harmful,
thereby triggering the stringent regulation of coal usage. While it may be desirable to create
systemic barriers to such rent-seeking behavior, see infra note 138, courts are ill-suited to un-
dertake such policy-laden action, unfocused as it would be in most cases on the impairment of
specific contractual obligations.
134. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. Duncan, 771 F.2d 707 (3d Cir. 1985) (re-
jecting a contract clause challenge on similar facts), aff'd sub nom. Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n. v. DeBenedictus, 107 S. Ct. 1232 (1987). The Keystone decision is discussed supra at
text accompanying notes 118-123
135. Least restrictive alternative analysis has been applied in a number of areas to require
that government, when it has available a variety of equally efflective means to a given end, must
choose the alternative that least interferes with constitutional rights. See Note, Less Drastic
Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). Examples of cases in which the
doctrine has been applied include Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-08 (1964)
(right to travel); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (First Amendment); Dean Milk Co. v.
City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (Commerce Clause).
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quiring the landowner rather than the mine operator to restore the land
in cases where the landowner has waived his or her right to damages, the
state could accomplish its goal of preserving the environment without
impairing vested contractual rights. Accordingly, in cases in which legis-
lation impairs contractual obligations in the interest of eliminating eco-
nomic externalities, courts must consider carefully whether any
alternative exists that would permit the legislature to meet its regulatory
objective without impairing obligations vested by contract.
The Contract Clause, correctly construed, thus will not prevent a
state ultimately from regulating activities as it wishes, but it may prevent
a state from imposing the costs of regulation without regard for vested
contractual rights. It is not a barrier to social change; it simply con-
strains that change to be consistent with the rule of law.
C. Prospective Application of the Clause-A Response to Professor
Epstein
Professor Richard Epstein has argued in a recent article that,
notwithstanding the decision in Ogden, the Clause should be read as ap-
plying prospectively-i e., to interferences with future contractual oppor-
tunities as well as to impairments of existing obligations. 136 Professor
Epstein can scarcely rely upon the text and the history of the Clause at
the Convention and in the ratification process for this proposition. 137 His
stronger and more elaborate argument derives from his view that the
overriding purpose of the Contract Clause, consonant with the overrid-
ing purpose of the Constitution, is to prevent "rent-seeking behavior,"
the product of which is legislation that redistributes wealth from one
group to another. 38  Professor Epstein argues that legislators are as
likely to redistribute wealth by the use of prospective interferences with
contractual opportunities as by retrospective interferences with rights
that have become vested under positive law. Moreover, the consequences
of prospective interference with contractual opportunities may be as
damaging as retrospective interferences, because expectations that have
not yet crystallized into vested rights may nevertheless be of enormous
136. See Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703,
723-730 (1984).
137. We have already explained how the history of the Clause at the convention and in the
ratification process supports our view of its interpretation. See supra notes 9-29 and accompa-
nying text.
138. Professor Epstein argues that the danger of oppression of minority rights that
Madison outlined in The Federalist is best characterized in modem terms as the danger of rent-
seeking behavior. See Epstein, supra note 136, at 713 (defining "rent-seeking" behavior as the
tendency of each interest group to use legislative power to expropriate the wealth of its rivals).
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importance to the individual. Therefore, Professor Epstein believes that
the rationale of the Clause applies equally to retrospective and prospec-
tive legislation.' 39
Clearly, prospective legislation can have a redistributive effect.
Nonetheless, there are fewer natural barriers to rent-seeking legislation
that .is retrospective in character than to that which is prospective.
When contractual rights and obligations have been fixed, the winners and
losers from the enactment of a bill affecting such rights are apparent and
fall in a well-defined and narrow class. For example, debtors will benefit
from debtor-relief legislation: the loss fals entirely on the creditors. As
the legislation becomes prospective, however, the affected class is less
narrowly defined. To use two examples that Professor Epstein believes
should be subject to the strictures of the Contract Clause, legislation that
forbids opticians from fitting eyeglasses without an optometrist's pre-
scription not only depresses the income of opticians but raises the prices
of glasses for consumers; legislation raising the minimum wage decreases
not only the value of property leased at long-term by labor intensive busi-
nesses but disadvantages consumers to whom the leaseholder will likely
pass on any extra costs. 14°
Unlike those affected by retrospective impairments, these two brief
examples reveal that those adversely affected by prospective legislation
should more readily find allies against the oppression of a faction seeking
the passage of self-serving legislation designed merely to redistribute
wealth to itself. Given the Framers' particular concern to prevent situa-
tions in which minority factions would be isolated and therefore easily
oppressed, it makes sense to erect special barriers against retrospective
139. Professor Epstein suggests that a retrospective reading of the Contract Clause would
lead to its ultimate vitiation, because states could simply pass so-called "reservation" statutes,
which would reserve to the legislature the right to make any changes it wished in any contracts
executed after the passage of the statute. We believe that "reservation" statutes of such
breadth would be unconstitutional, because they would constitute a blatant attempt to statuto-
rily repeal the Contract Clause from our constitutional scheme. The statutes would be a decla-
ration that the legislature could exercise arbitrary will despite the fact that the Clause was
introduced to prevent such arbitrariness. See supra text accompanying notes 5-9. Just as Con-
gress cannot create so many exceptions to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction as to destroy the
Court's essential role in the constitutional plan, see generally Hart, The Power of Congress to
Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362
(1953), a state legislature cannot reserve so much power as to render the Contract Clause a
nullity. Moreover, just as political pressures make it unlikely that Congress will enact broad
exceptions to the Supreme Court's jurisdiction, similar pressures make it unlikely that a state
legislature would enact a reservation statute permitting the modification of all statutes. Our
constitutional jurisprudence should focus on situations that are likely to arise rather than on
extravagant possibilities that the realities of our polity render remote.
140. For Professor Epstein's discussion of these examples, see Epstein, supra note 136, at
725-26.
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legislation.14 1  Conversely, because prospective legislation will affect a
more diverse group of factions, there is more reason to believe that the
legislative process will strike a proper balance between economic liberties
and the protection of the needs of the general welfare.
Moreover, Professor Epstein's proposed rule of protecting expecta-
tions premised on prospective agreements would be difficult to apply and
would be so expansive as to be inconsistent with the structure of federal-
ism that underlies the Constitution. Since all legislation affects expecta-
tions, indulging Professor Epstein's interpretation of the Clause would
permit federal judicial review of the substantive merits of almost all state
enactments and would invite the federal judiciary to determine whether a
state's interest underlying legislation is sufficient to defeat inchoate ex-
pectations.I42 In short, the error in Professor Epstein's analysis is his
assumption that because the Framers were concerned about legislation
that redistributed wealth at the expense of a minority, they were willing
to structure the polity in such a way as to negate the risk of all such
legislation, even at the cost of eviscerating other values such as represen-
tative government and federalism.
Conclusion
Two important lessons may be drawn from this survey of contract
clause history. The first is that the Supreme Court is more likely to de-
cide cases according to neutral principles when the Court remains faith-
ful to the original meaning of the Clause. It is ironic that the Supreme
Court has chosen to apply the Contract Clause by balancing social inter-
ests in the manner of the legislature when the intent of the Clause was to
forbid legislatures from retrospectively interfering with contracts. It is
equally ironic that the Supreme Court has interpreted a constitutional
provision that was designed to provide certainty to contracting parties in
a manner that maximizes the unpredictability of its application. The ge-
nius of the Framers was that they formulated a provision which ad-
vanced the rule of law by minimizing the amount of balancing of
141. We have already noted that the Framers were particularly concerned with protecting
a minority faction when it was likely that the faction would be isolated. See supra notes 16-18
and accompanying text.
142. Because under Professor Epstein's theory of the Clause all state legislation would be
potentially subject to its strictures, courts would necessarily have to engage in a significant
amount of balancing in order to decide which legislation was sufficiently justified by health or
safety considerations to be upheld. This kind of jurisprudence transforms the Court into, a
kind of super legislature, which we believe is fundamentally inconsistent with the Court's func-
tion under the separation of powers.
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interests that is contrary both to the purpose of the provision and the
judicial function.
Our review of the Clause also underscores the importance of con-
struing constitutional provisions in light of those concepts which the
Framers viewed as fundamental to the preservation of liberty in a civil
society. Two of these concepts-the separation of powers and federal-
ism-are familiar. The rule of law and the prevention of the oppression
of interests of minority factions may be less familiar, but equally deserv-
ing of serious consideration.
Besides contributing to the preservation of liberty through adher-
ence to the rule of law, the original understanding of the Contract Clause
serves as a principled demarcation between substantive due process and
the judicial abnegation of review over economic legislation. The Con-
tract Clause does not license the judiciary to prevent economic or social
policies from ultimately being instituted by the legislative branch. States
may pass legislation that greatly restricts the ability to make particular
contracts in the future. However, the Contract Clause does secure from
legislative impairment those enterprises in which a citizen is currently
engaged and in which he or she possesses vested, tangible rights. The
Contract Clause slows democratic change in social organization and dis-
tribution, but it does not preclude it. In the end, a return to the original
understanding of the Contract Clause would permit an open, democratic
future while respecting essential rights that have been acquired under the
democratically enacted laws of the past.
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